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SALVAGING THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD-IS IT A
LOST CAUSE? THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS
. INTRODUCTION
In Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania,1 three
members of the United States Supreme Court announced a new "undue
burden" standard for evaluating state abortion regulations.2 Critics from
both sides of the abortion debate immediately denounced the new
constitutional standard as unsatisfactory, but these groups disagreed as to
which political position the undue burden standard furthered. For example,
a conservative commentator criticized the undue burden standard as
"infinitely malleable" in the hands of judges,3 while a progressive
commentator regarded it as a moderate "seed" deliberately planted for
courts to cultivate into more conservative results in the future.4 Justice
Scalia bitterly accused the Justices who adopted the undue burden standard
of decorating a value judgment and concealing a political choice.' Yet
Justice Blackmun suggested that the undue burden standard may not lie far
from Justice Scalia's position.6
This Note seeks to clear the confusion surrounding the undue burden
standard by locating it within the traditional realm of constitutional analysis
and then exposing the possibility that use of the standard will subtly
1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. Id. at 2819-32.
3. The Case Against Casey, NEW REPUBLIC, July 27, 1992, at 7.
4. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22, 111 (1992). Both pro-choice and pro-life leaders viewed the Casey decision as a loss for their side.
Compare Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Impact of the Undue Burden Standard on
Reproductive Health Care, JAMA, May 5, 1993, at 2249 (discussing the negative effects that may result
from Casey's undue burden standard) with Steven RL Helmer et. al, Abortion: A Principled Politics,
NAT'L REv., Dec. 27, 1993, at 40 (advocating adoption of a framework more conservative than
Casey's).
5. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2875. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Commentators have echoed Justice Scalia's
criticism. See The Case Against Casey, supra note 3, at 7 ("[The Court's] only justification for treating
abortion differently [than other fundamental rights] is their purely personal and legislative judgment that
the state's interest in discouraging abortions is somehow different than its interest in restricting other
protected rights.").
6. 112 S. Ct. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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undermine fundamental rights protection.! This Note proposes that courts
salvage the undue burden standard by adding a second step of analysis that
directly confronts the standard's ability to dilute fundamental rights. Part
II traces the development of the undue burden standard in abortion cases
as well as other fundamental rights cases. Part II examines the Casey
formulation of the undue burden standard and then discusses the negative
implications of that formulation for abortion rights and fundamental rights
generally. Part IV proposes a modified undue burden standard that includes
an inquiry into legislative motive. Part V uses three case examples to
demonstrate how the proposed undue burden standard differs from the
Casey undue burden standard. Finally, Part VI argues that the Supreme
Court and lower courts should adopt the proposed undue burden standard
to stop the further erosion of fundamental rights protection.
II. PRE-CAsEY DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD
A. Initial Use of the Undue Burden Standard Within the Abortion
Context
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's first use of the undue burden
standard, Roe v. Wade8 defined Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence. In
Roe, the Supreme Court announced that a woman, prior to the point at
which her fetus attains viability, possesses a fundamental right to choose
whether to have an abortion.9 The fundamental character of the right to
choose to have an abortion triggered the Court's application of the
traditional "strict scrutiny" test to the Texas abortion regulations at issue in
7. This Note focuses upon the case history and constitutional framework of the actual undue
burden standard. It does not comment in detail upon the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence or the
Casey opinion itself. For commentary focusing on these aspects of Casey, see Jon D. Anderson, Note,
Abortion: State Regulations-Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 76 MARQ. L. REv. 317 (1992); Kenneth
IR Farrow, Roe v. Wade and the Future ofa Woman's Right to an Abortion, 14 VHriT-R L. REV. 695
(1993); John L. Horan, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 26 CREIaHTON L.
REV. 479 (1993); C. Elaine Howard, The Roe'dto Confusion: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 30 HoUs.
L. REv. 1457 (1993); William G. Peterson, SplinteredDecislons, Implicit Reversals and Lower Federal
Courts: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 289; Rachael K. Pimer & Laurie B.
Williams, Roe to Casey: A Survey of Abortion Law, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 166 (1993); Mark H. Woltz,
Note, A Bold Reaffirmation? Planned Parenthood v. Casey Opens the Door for States to Enact New
Laws to Discourage Abortion, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1787 (1993).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. Id. at 163. The Court grounded the abortion right in its privacy jurisprudence. Id. at 152-54.
296 [VOL. 73:295
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/6
SALVAGING THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD
Roe.'" Under strict scrutiny, a state must prove that its legislature "narrow-
ly" drew its enactment to meet a "compelling" state interest." The Roe
Court found that prior to viability, only the state interest in regulating a
mother's health proved compelling.12 Thus, the state could impose
regulations intended to address concerns regarding a woman's health, but
the state could not impose regulations designed solely to discourage or stop
a woman from having an abortion.13 After a fetus reaches viability,
however, the state interest in potential life becomes compelling, and the
state can use regulations to influence or completely negate a woman's
decision. 4 Notably, the Court rejected consideration of any moral or
theological theory of life in making its determination that the state interest
in protecting potential life is compelling. 5 Instead, it grounded its finding
of a compelling state interest in "logical and biological justifications." 6
The Supreme Court first explicitly used the undue burden standard within
the abortion context in a line of cases concerning government funding of
abortions.'7 In Maher v. Roe,'" the Court held that a state's refusal to use
10. Id. at 155. The Roe Court considered Articles 1191-1194 and 1196 of the Texas Penal Code,
which made it a crime to attempt or to procure an abortion, except where necessary to save the life of
the mother. Id. at 117-19.
1. Id. This mode of substantive due process analysis comprises the upper tier of the Supreme
Court's "two-tier scrutiny." Under two-tier scrutiny, the Court will subject governmental regulations
affecting fundamental rights to the most exacting scrutiny, strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny asks whether
a regulation is "necessary" to promote a "compelling" state interest. The Court scrutinizes regulations
affecting nonfundamental liberty and property interests under the less stringent rational relation test.
Under the rational relation test, the state must show that regulations are "rationally" related to
"legitimate" government purposes. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process,
Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 309, 314-15 (1993).
12. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
13. Id. The Court gave examples of permissible health regulations, including regulations governing
the qualifications or licensure of the person performing the abortion and the type of facility in which
the procedure should take place. Id Further, the Court stated that during this previability period a
physician and patient remain "free to determine, without regulation by the state," whether the patient
should have an abortion. Id.
14. Id. at 163-64.
15. The Roe Court repeatedly refused to accept Texas' assertion that life begins at conception. Id.
at 150 ("[A] legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that
life begins at conception . .. ."); id. at 159 ("When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary... is not in
a position to speculate as to the answer."); id. at 162 ("[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory
of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.").
16. Id. at 163.
17. The most well-known cases are Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S.
519 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); and Williams
v, Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980). These cases will be referred to collectively as the abortion-funding
cases throughout the remainder of this Note.
18. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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state Medicaid benefits to fund nontherapeutic abortions did not violate the
Constitution. 9 Three years later, in Harris v. McRae,2° the Court applied
the Maher rationale to uphold the Hyde Amendment's2 ' prohibition on the
use of Social Security funds for nontherapeutic and therapeutic abor-
tions. In both Maher and McRae, the Court found that a government's
denial of abortion funds did not create an "undue burden" on the abortion
right established in Roe.'
The use of the term "undue burden" in Maher and McRae initially
appeared to change the basic test for the application of strict scrutiny laid
out in Roe. In Maher, the Court stated that the right recognized in Roe
depended both on the nature of the woman's interest and the state's
interference with that interest.24 Although the Court reaffirmed that the
woman's right to an abortion was fundamental,' it appeared to condition
the protection of her fundamental right on the quantity of state interference
with that right.26 Only if the amount of state interference with a funda-
mental right rose to the level of "unduly burdensome" would the Court
recognize an "impingement" on that right and apply strict scrutiny.
Under this reading of Maher and McRae, the Court seemed to have
introduced a new threshold requirement for strict scrutiny. That is, the
Court would apply strict scrutiny to state action that interferes with a
fundamental right only if the state action creates an undue burden on the
fundamental right. The addition of this threshold requirement would
constitute a significant change in the Roe analysis. In Roe, the Court looked
solely to the nature of the individual right at stake. If the state interfered
with a fundamental right, no matter the level of interference, the Court
would apply strict scrutiny.27
19. Id. at 474.
20. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
21. The Court described the Hyde Amendment as a congressional prohibition on the use of federal
finds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program, except in limited circumstances.
Id. at 302.
22. Ird. at 315.
23. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
24. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473.
25. Id. at 471.
26. Id. at 473-74. The Court stated: "Roe did not declare an unqualified 'constitutional right to an
abortion,' as the District Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
27. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the analysis in Roe. Because
Roe follows the Supreme Court's traditional substantive due process analysis, this potential addition of
an undue burden analysis would deviate from at least forty-five years of Supreme Court decisions. "In
[VOL. 73:295
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However, closer analysis indicates that the Court in Maher and McRae
did not add a threshold requirement to the Roe analysis. Rather, the Court
equated the term undue burden with the concept of an obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion. The Court drew a distinction between
such obstacles, which will almost always constitute an undue burden,28
and state funding decisions. According to the Court, the denial of govern-
ment funds "place[d] no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the pregnant
woman's path to an abortion."29 That is, the state's denial of funds placed
indigent pregnant women in no worse position than they otherwise would
have been.3" Because the state merely withheld funds, as opposed to
placing affirmative restrictions on abortion, the Maher Court found that the
state did not unduly interfere with the fundamental right to abortion. In
turn, if a state act does not unduly interfere with a fundamental right, the
state act does not "impinge" upon the right.3" And, consistent with Roe,
if state action does not impinge upon a fundamental right, the Court will
apply a rational relation analysis, not strict scrutiny.32 Therefore, although
the Court in Maher and McRae used the term undue burden, it did so only
within the context of a state's denial of funds for abortion, rather than a
state's affirmative regulation of abortion. As such, it did not change the
basic Roe analysis for state abortion regulations.33
1945, the Supreme Court stated that 'it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which
determines what [judicial] standard governs the [legislative] choice."' Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond
the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-
Rights Analysis and the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 746 (1981) (quoting Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
28. Maher, 432 U.S. at 472. The Court noted that the state's imposition of criminal penalties in
Roe constituted one such impermissible obstacle to abortion. Id.
29. 1d. at 474.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 473-74. The Court stated:
[T]he [Roe] right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom
to decide whether to terminate her pregancy .... The Connecticut regulation before us is
different in kind from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. The
Connecticut regulation places no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the pregnant woman's
path to an abortion .... The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative,
thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to
abortions that was not already there .... We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does
not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.
Id.
32. See id. at 478; supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
33. The Maher Court acknowledged that it did not change the Roe analysis:
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. There is a basic
difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest
1995]
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Because a state's denial of funds triggers only rational basis review,
however, the state does not have to justify its denial of funding with a
"compelling" interest. Under the rational relation standard, a state can
implement its value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion. Thus, the
abortion-funding cases show that while the government cannot impose its
will through direct legislative obstacles that inhibit fundamental rights, it
can impose its will through the selective disbursement of taxpayer funds.34
The Court used a similar analysis in two cases involving the right of a
minor to obtain an abortion. In the two related cases of Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti 135 and Bellotti / 36), the Court considered the constitutionality
of state statutes that created procedural hurdles for minors seeking an
abortion. The Court's analysis differed from that in Roe in two ways.
First, in Bell6tti I, the Court found that a state may impose more stringent
regulations on a minor who seeks an abortion than on an adult.38 In
addition, in both Bellotti I and Bellotti 11, the Court implied that abortion
when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage
actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
432 U.S. at 475-76 (citations omitted).
34. The dissent in both Maher and McRae argued that the Court's distinction between affirmative
government regulation and spending decisions allowed the legislature to impose incrementally a
majoritarian moral view on a protected fundamental right. Maher, 432 U.S. at 484-85 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); McRae, 448 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he Hyde Amendment is a transparent attempt by the Legislative Branch to impose the
political majority's judgment of the morally acceptable and socially desirable preference on
a sensitive and intimate decision that the Constitution entrusts to the individual. Worse yet,
the Hyde Amendment does not foist that majoritarian viewpoint with equal measure upon
everyone in our Nation, rich and poor alike; rather, it imposes that viewpoint only upon that
segment of our society which, because of its position of political powerlessness, is least able
to defend its privacy rights from the encroachment of state-mandated morality.
McRae, 448 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court reaffirmed the state's right to impose its will through its spending choices in Maher's
companion case, Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977) (holding that a state may further its interest
in encouraging normal childbirth by denying Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions). In Poelker
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), the Court extended this rationale to a municipal government's spending
decisions and held that the city of St. Louis could refuse to provide publicly funded hospital services
for nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at 521.
35. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
36. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
37. In Bellotti I, the Court declined to hold unconstitutionally vague a Massachusetts statute
requiring parental consent before an unmarried woman under the age of 18 could obtain an abortion.
428 U.S. at 147. In Bellotti , the Court held unconstitutional a judicial bypass procedure because it
did not allow a minor to avoid parental consultation by showing either maturity or that the abortion
decision reflected her best interest. 443 U.S. at 646-48.
38. BellottifI, 443 U.S. at 635. The Court noted that minors lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment that adults possess to recognize and avoid choices that could harm them. Id.
(VOL. 73:295
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regulations must not "unduly burden" a minor's right to an abortion."
In Bellotti I and 11, the Court used a different undue burden analysis than
it had in the abortion-funding cases. In the abortion-funding cases, the
Court implied that virtually any affirmative regulation of abortion
constituted an obstacle to a woman's exercise of her abortion right and,
thus, created an undue burden which triggered strict scrutiny. However, in
Bellotti I and 11, even though affirmative regulations were involved, the
Court appeared to weigh the amount that the regulation interfered with the
right to abortion.' Thus, the Court used the term undue burden in a sense
that is more consistent with the phrase itself-it weighed the amount of
state interference with a fundamental right and determined whether the
interference rose to the level of an undue burden.
B. Use of the Undue Burden Standard Beyond the Abortion Context
In two cases not involving a woman's right to have an abortion, the
Court also used phrases suggestive of an undue burden analysis. In San
Antonio v. Rodriguez," the Court found that, even if education constituted
a fundamental right, Texas' system of financing public elementary and
secondary schools did not impermissibly interfere with that right.42 The
Rodriguez Court found that Texas' educational financing system did not
impose an undue burden on the right to receive an education because the
financing system, in the Court's view, constituted an "affirmative and
reformatory" governmental measure,43 rather than a deprivation or
39. Bellotti I, 428 U.S. at 147 (dicta) ("Without holding that a requirement of a court hearing
would not unduly burden the rights of a mature adult... .'); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 640 ("The question
before us... is whether § 12S ... does not unduly burden the right to seek an abortion.").
40. See Bellotti I, 428 U.S. at 148 ("Nor need we determine what factors are impermissible or at
what point review of consent and good cause in the case of a minor becomes unduly burdensome.')
(dicta); Bellotti 1, 443 U.S. at 646-48 (holding that a parental notification requirement without
exception constitutes an undue burden but the same procedure with a judicial bypass does not).
41. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Even though Rodriguez concerned the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's discussion of fundamental rights also applies to cases involving
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. See generally Virginia L. Hardwick, Note, Punishing
the Innocent; Unconstitutional Restrictions on Prison Marriage and Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv., 275,
303 (1985) (describing the Court's often interchangeable substantive due process and equal protection
fundamental rights analysis).
42. 411 U.S. at 35-38. The Rodriguez Court found that education did not constitute a fundamental
right. Id. at 35. Nonetheless, the Court held that, even if education did constitute a fundamental right,
the Texas system did not interfere with that right to the extent necessary to constitute an unconstitution-
al deprivation. Id. at 36-38.
43. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 39. The Court likened the educational system to the federal law that
it considered in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The Rodriguez Court noted that the law
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interference with a fundamental right.'
Similarly, in Zablocki v. Redhail,45 the Court found that an affirmative
state regulation that restricted the right to marry "directly and substantially"
interfered with the right to marry.46 Although the language used by the
Zablocki Court suggested that the Court weighed the amount of interference
created by the regulation,47 the Court drew the same distinction as it had
in the abortion-funding cases between affirmative state regulation and the
denial of state funds.48 While a denial of Social Security benefits upon
marriage was not a "direct legal obstacle" in the path of a person seeking
marriage,49 a state law that forbade marriage to persons who owed child
support payments was.5"
Thus, as in Maher and McRae, the Court in Rodriguez and Zablocki
recognized that a state can dissuade its citizens from exercising their
fundamental rights if such interference consists of the deprivation of
government benefits. In contrast, where a state enacts regulations that
affirmatively limit the exercise of a fundamental right, the state must prove
that its act serves a compelling end.
in Katzenbach extended a right to persons otherwise denied that right by state law. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 38-39. Thus, the Rodriguez Court reasoned that where a government reform or benefit affects a
fundamental right, the government may extend the benefit or effect the reform in progressive stages
rather than all at one time. Id. at 39 (citing Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 646-47).
44. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 38. The Court distinguished the Texas funding system from a state act
which "deprive[s], infringe[s], or interfere[s] with the free exercise of... [a] fundamental personal right
or liberty." Id.
45. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
46. 434 U.S. at 387.
47. Id. at 386. The Court stated:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest
that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for
marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that
do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legiti-
mately be imposed.
Id.
48. Id. at 386-87.
49. Id. at 387.
50. Id. Interestingly, the Zablocki Court suggested that even if members of the class affected by
the statute were not "sufficiently burdened" by the statute, the statute was still problematic because the
members would "suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of choice in an area in which we have
held such freedom to be fundamental." Id. This suggests that where affirmative state regulations are
involved, weighing the amount of burden created is unnecessary; that is, any affirmative regulations
which bear upon a fundamental right constitute a direct and substantial interference which triggers strict
scrutiny.
302
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C. The Precedential Value of the Undue Burden Standard
The Court's use of the undue burden standard in the abortion-funding
cases and in the other fundamental rights cases discussed above created
only a limited precedent for the extension of the undue burden standard in
later cases involving affirmative state abortion regulations. In the abortion-
funding cases, Rodriguez, and Zablocki, the Court used the phrase undue
burden to mean an obstacle in the path of a person exercising a fundamen-
tal right. Under this usage, all affirmative regulations constitute undue
burdens. In the Bellotti cases, which involved the abortion rights of minors,
the Court used the phrase undue burden to weigh the amount of intrusion
created by an affirmative regulation. However, state regulations inhibiting
the abortion rights of minors arguably should be subjected to a lower level
of scrutiny."' Thus, before Casey, the Supreme Court did not use the
undue burden standard to weigh the amount of intrusion on an adult's
fundamental right, and, accordingly, it did not condition the application of
strict scrutiny on a threshold level of interference.
D. Justice O'Connor's Adoption of the Undue Burden Standard
Despite the limited precedential support for the undue burden standard,
almost a decade before Casey Justice O'Connor began to advocate
changing the standard of review in all abortion cases from traditional two-
tier scrutiny" to the undue burden standard. In City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health (Akron 1) 3 and Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,4 a majority of the Court used
strict scrutiny to strike down state abortion regulations, including a second-
trimester hospitalization requirement," informed consent provisions,56 a
state reporting requirement, 7 and a printed information requirement.58
51. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Bellotti cases. In Bellotti
II, the Court noted that "even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state
to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults."' 443 U.S. at
636 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S 158, 170 (1944))); see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (discussing additional
power of the state over minors).
52. See supra note 11 for an explanation of traditional two-tier scrutiny.
53. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
54. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
55. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 442-33.
56. Id. at 443-44; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760-64.
57, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765-68.
58. Id. at 762-63.
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Justice O'Connor dissented from both cases and found the regulations
constitutional because they did not impose an undue burden on a woman
seeking an abortion. 9
In extrapolating the "undue burden" test,' Justice O'Connor looked to
the abortion-funding cases,"' Bellotti 1,62 and various other fundamental
rights cases, including Rodriguez.63 O'Connor found the undue burden test
particularly appropriate in the context of abortion rights, because she
viewed the abortion right as more limited in nature and scope than other
fundamental rights."
In both Akron I and Thornburgh, Justice O'Connor differed strikingly
from the Court majorities on the question whether a state may attempt to
influence a woman's abortion decision prior to viability. The majority in
59. See Akron , 462 U.S. at 452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Akron I, Justice O'Connor stated that, because abortion does not constitute
an absolute right, a state may constitutionally "inhibit" abortions. 462 U.S. at 461-62 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
60. See Akron I, 462 U.S. at 453, 461-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 461-62 n.8. See supra notes 17-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
abortion-funding cases. Justice O'Connor stated that the unduly burdensome standard applied in the
abortion-funding cases also directly applies to cases involving affirmative state abortion regulations.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 461-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In doing so, she ignored the context in which the
undue burden standard was applied. In the abortion-funding cases, the Court considered whether the
state's decision to withhold funds from indigent women seeking abortions created an undue burden on
their right to abortion. In those cases, the Court explicitly recognized that the withholding of funds is
state action different in character than affirmative regulations with accompanying criminal penalties. See
supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. A majority of the Court has not applied the undue burden
standard where affirmative state abortion regulations are at issue. Justice Scalia noted this distinction
in Casey when he stated that Justice O'Connor's reliance on the abortion-funding cases "is entirely
misplaced, since those cases did not involve regulation of abortion but mere refusal to fund it." Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2877 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Professor Appleton correctly predicted this expansion of the unduly burdensome requirement from
cases involving the positive right to obtain an abortion at the government's expense to the negative right
to be free from government interference in obtaining an abortion. Appleton, supra note 27, at 750-51.
She stated, "The doctrine may reach beyond demands for what amount to positive rights, to
uphold-without the demonstration of a compelling state interest-active state interference producing
only (so-called) 'slight' intrusions held not to constitute impingements, on protected negative rights."
Id. at 750 (citations omitted).
62. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of BellottI L
63. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rodriguez. Justice O'Connor
also cited Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S.
678, 703 (1987), as precedent for applying the undue burden standard in Akron L Akron 1, 462 U.S. at
462 n.8 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, the Carey majority did not adopt the standard explicitly,
and Justice Powell later criticized the undue burden test. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he degree of 'direct' interference with the decision to marry or to divorce is unlikely
to provide either guidance for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight.').
64. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 463-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/6
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both cases cautioned states against the adoption of religious views in
regulating the exercise of the right to abortion.65 In contrast, Justice
O'Connor trusted the collective morality reflected in state legislative actions
to guide a woman's abortion decision, even to the point where such
guidance restricts her range of choices.' Justice O'Connor's analysis
would allow the state to purposely dissuade a woman from exercising her
fundamental right to have an abortion by creating regulatory barriers that
make the exercise of that choice more difficult.67
65. Id. at 443-45. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 777-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Akron I, the
majority struck down an informed consent provision because it attempted to dissuade women from
obtaining an abortion prior to viability. The court found that the provision was beyond the scope of the
health interest recognized in Roe. Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 444. The Court stated, "[A] State may not adopt
one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions." Id. at 444 (citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 159-62 (1973)). Similarly, the majority in Thornburgh found that the regulations in that
case reflected a disguised attempt by the state to "intimidate women into continuing pregnancies." 476
U.S. at 759. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens rejected the state's assertion of authority to influence
a woman's decision, noting that "It]he Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere
of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government." Id. at 772 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor criticized this wholesale prohibition on any state regulation which might
influence a woman's decision whether to have an abortion, calling it a "prophylactic test." Id. at 829
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
66. Justice O'Connor did acknowledge a limit to the amount of permissible state interference,
conceding that states could not impose an absolute obstacle or coercive restraint. Akron 1, 462 U.S. at
464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, she found mere "inhbit[ion]" of the abortion right acceptable.
Id. Justice O'Connor stated:
[W]e must keep in mind that when we are concerned with extremely sensitive issues, such
as the one involved here, "the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the
legislature. We should not forget that 'legislatures are the ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts."'
Id. at 465 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 479-80 (citation omitted)).
Justice Stevens took the opposite view:
[I]t is far better to permit some individuals to make incorrect decisions than to deny all
individuals the right to make decisions that have a profound effect upon their destiny.
Arguably a very primitive society would have been protected from evil by a rule against
eating apples; a majority familiar with Adam's experience might favor such a rule. But the
lawmakers who placed a special premium on the protection of individual liberty have
recognized that certain values are more important than the will of a transient majority.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 781-82 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67. Between 1989 and 1992, it appeared that Justice O'Connor was not alone in her dissatisfaction
with the Court's use of strict scrutiny to review state abortion regulations. However, the justices who
sought to abandon strict scrutiny continued to adhere to the same basic fundamental rights analysis
employed in Roe. They simply argued for rational basis review of abortion regulations. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), a majority of the court, for the first time since Roe,
failed to employ strict scrutiny analysis in an abortion case. The Missouri statute at issue in Webster
required viability testing and prohibited the use of public funds, employees, or facilities to perform
abortions. Id. at 501. While four members of the Court applied rational basis review to uphold the
statute, id. at 520, Justice O'Connor applied the undue burden test to reach the same result. Id. at 530
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, an advocate of rational basis review, criticized Justice
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m. THE CASEY ADOPTION OF THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD AND ITS
BROADER IMPLICATIONS
A. The Casey Opinion
In Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania,6 Justice
O'Connor seized the opportunity to change the standard of review in all
abortion cases from traditional strict scrutiny to the "undue burden"
standard. Because a majority of the Court stood firmly divided on the issue
of the correct standard of scrutiny,69 a moderate three-member plurality"
signed on to the compromise of applying the "undue burden" standard to
uphold five out of six Pennsylvania abortion restrictions.7
The joint opinion reaffirmed the basic holding in Roe that a woman does
have a right to resolve the difficult question whether to abort her pregnan-
O'Connor's use of the undue burden standard: "I know of no basis for determining that this particular
burden (or any other for that matter) is 'due.' One could with equal justification conclude that it is not."
Id. at 526 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Webster foreshadowed the subtle transition from a denial of positive
rights to a denial of negative rights:
Missouri has brought to bear the full force of its economic power and control over essential
facilities to discourage citizens from exercising their constitutional rights, even where the
State itself could never be understood as authorizing, supporting, or having any other positive
association with the performance of an abortion (citation omitted) ...
The difference is critical .... Even if the state may decline to subsidize... the exercise of
woman's right to terminate a pregnancy ... . it may not affirmatively constrict the availability
of abortions ....
Id. at 540 n.1 (Blacknmn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Court also began to give states more leeway with respect to abortion regulations for minors. In
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), the Court upheld a statute that required a minor to give
both parents notice of the abortion. The Minnesota statute provided for a judicial bypass exception. Id.
at 422-27. In Akron v. Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Akron I1), the Court
upheld a judicial bypass provision for minors under which a minor had to prove maturity by clear and
convincing evidence.
68. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
69. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and White anchored the conservative end of the court,
while Justices Blackmun and Stevens spoke for the liberal end.
70. 112 S. Ct. at 2803. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter signed on to the joint opinion
written by Justice O'Connor. Id.
71. Id. The provisions upheld include: (1) a requirement of informed consent and notice of state-
provided materials encouraging childbirth; (2) a twenty-four-hour waiting period; (3) parental consent
for women under eighteen, including a judicial bypass; (4) a state recordkeeping requirement; and (5)
a "medical emergency" provision exempting compliance with the detailed requirements. Id. at 2821-26,
2832. The Court found unconstitutional a provision requiring spousal consent. Id. at 2826-31.
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cy. 72 However, it also found that a state may persuade a woman not to
have an abortion so long as, in so doing, it does not go too far. 3 Thus,
while a state may not calculate to hinder a woman's choice,74 "strike at
the right itself,"'75 or deprive the woman of all choice in the matter,76 it
may express a preference' for normal childbirth by attempting to ensure
that a woman makes a thoughtful and informed choice78 and knows the
philosophical and social arguments in favor of continuing her pregnancy. 79
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, in their individual opinions, shared the
view that, because abortion falls within the realm of fundamental rights, a
state may never use regulations to persuade a woman to abandon her
72. 112 S. Ct. at 2816-17. The joint opinion reaffirms the fundamental right to privacy, noting that
each person enjoys "a realm of personal liberty" which the government may not enter and which
includes "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life" free of compulsion by the state. Id. at 2807. Yet, the joint opinion avoids
explicitly classifying the right to have an abortion as a fundamental privacy right. The authors of the
joint opinion noted: "[I]n some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same character as the
decision to use contraception." Id. at 2805-06. However, they also distinguished the right to abortion
from other privacy rights:
These [privacy] considerations begin our analysis of the woman's interest in terminating her
pregnancy but cannot end it, for this reason: though the abortion decision may originate
within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise. Abortion is
a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others ....
Id. at 2807.
73. This standard may seem reminiscent of the infamous standard for judging obscenity-"I know
it when I see it"--suggested by Justice Stevens in Smith v. United States. 431 U.S. 291, 313-14 n.9
(1977) (citing Jacobellis v. Ott, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). The joint opinion's
authors found that Roe and the cases following it overstated the right to an abortion, because those cases
held that a state could not attempt to influence a woman's decision prior to viability. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
at 2819-20. The joint opinion advocates the undue burden standard because it allows the state to
influence a woman while simultaneously allowing a woman to choose whether to have an abortion. Id.
at 2820-21. Others criticize this balancing act as illogical. See id. at 2877 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Any
regulation of abortion that is intended to advance what the joint opinion concedes is the State's
'substantial' interest in protecting unborn life will be 'calculated [to] hinder' a decision to have an
abortion."); Washington Brief Will the Justices Answer the Abortion Question?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3,
1992, at 7 (quoting Roger Evans, director of litigation for Planned Parenthood Federation) ("It is either
a fundamental right or not. If the Court announces a middle-of-the-road position, it has done an
extraordinary thing; it has demoted a fundamental right. It's taken away, whether by meat cleaver or
whittling knife.").
74. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
75. Id. at 2819.
76. Id. at 2806.
77. Id. at 2818.
78. Id,
79. Id.
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abortion decision."0 Justice Blackmun acknowledged that, under Roe, a
state may interfere with a fundamental right in order to pursue important,
value-neutral health objectives." However, he maintained that such
interference may constitute only a de minimis burden, a lesser burden than
the joint opinion found permissible.82 Similarly, Justice Stevens distin-
guished permissible value-neutral state regulations from those that
wrongfully attempt to persuade a woman not to abort a fetus.83 Stevens
and Blackmun agreed that, while a state may freely encourage childbirth
through its allocation of public funds, a state may not use direct regulations
to "inject [its moral view] into a woman's most personal deliberations.""
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist in their respective individual opinions,
advocated overruling Roe completely and sending the abortion issue back
to state legislatures.85 They agreed that active state interference with a
fundamental right potentially undermines the protection that fundamental
rights have traditionally afforded the individual.86 Both Justices warned
that the undue burden standard would allow lower court judges to
adjudicate based upon their own moral judgments about abortion.87 Justice
80. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part); id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. Id. at 2847 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2840-41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (quoting Stevens, J., at 2840).
85. Id. at 2865, 2873 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia stated that the democratic process should decide the abortion question, because the current
national rule does not afford some participants "a fair hearing and an honest fight." Id. at 2885 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
86. See id. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Id. at
2860 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist
commented that although the rule established in Roe still exists in theory, it exists only in the sense that
a Western movie set exists: "a mere facade to give the illusion of reality." Id. Justice Scalia recognized
the danger that the undue burden standard presents to fundamental rights protection. Although he agreed
with Justice Blackmun that fundamental rights may tolerate incidental burdens without triggering strict
scrutiny, he called the undue burden threshold of toleration a "quite different (and quite dangerous)
proposition" through which the authors of the joint opinion "place all constitutional rights at risk." Id.
at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
87. Id. at 2866 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Id. at
2877 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist predicted
that the standard will allow judges to ."roam at large in the constitutional field,' guided only by their
personal views," id. at 2866 (citation omitted), and Justice Scalia called the standard "inherently
manipulable and ... hopelessly unworkable in practice." Id. at 2877.
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Scalia, in particular, criticized Justice O'Conor's standard as inconsis-
tent' and unwarranted. 9
B. Implications of Casey for Abortion and Other Fundamental Rights
I. Abortion
Casey altered the standard of review for all abortion cases by extending
the undue burden standard to cases involving the affirmative regulation of
abortion. Before Casey, in determining which standard of review to apply
to a state's direct regulation of the abortion right, lower courts did not
consider the amount of interference that a regulation created. Rather, under
Roe, courts automatically found that the fundamental character of the
individual right at stake warranted strict scrutiny. Under that standard, any
state attempt to persuade a woman to abandon her choice violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9  Following Casey, a lower court now must
determine the extent to which a potentially coercive regulation inhibits a
woman's right to have an abortion. If the regulation does not create an
undue burden, the court must apply the more lenient rational basis review
to the regulation." Under Casey, this "undue burden" analysis applies
even if the state regulation reflects moral coercion.'
88. Id. at 2876-79 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The joint
opinion defines an 'undue' burden as a state action that "merely imposes a substantial obstacle." Yet,
Justice Scalia noted that this definition contradicts Justice O'Connor's previous opinions which define
a more narrow set of "undue" burdens: those which impose "absolute obstacles or severe limitations
on the abortion decision." Id. at 2878 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 2876-77 & n.3. Scalia launched a vigorous attack on O'Connor's attempt to ground the
undue burden standard in the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence. Scalia's criticism rests on three
points: first, that the Court's undue burden language inBellottilreflects a mere "passing use"; second,
that while Justice Powell did use a form of the standard in a few, nonmajority opinions, he later rejected
it; and third, that the abortion-funding cases did not serve as adequate precedent, because those cases
involved government benefits. Id. at 2876 n.3.
Scalia even quipped: "I should be grateful, I suppose, that the joint opinion does not claim that I,
too, have adopted the undue burden test" Id at 2877 n.4. He continued: "The 'undue burden' standard
is not at all the generally applicable principle the joint opinion pretends it to be; rather, it is a unique
concept created specially for this case, to preserve some judicial foothold in this ill-gotten territory."
Id. at 2878.
90. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roe.
91. See supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Casey. Interestingly,
Professor Appleton points out that, because the failure to meet the unduly burdensome standard means
that the state action at issue does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment one might ask, "[w]hy must
any constitutional standard of review apply?" Appleton, supra note 27, at 748.
92. Under traditional fundamental rights analysis, strict scrutiny would be triggered; thus, the court
would require the state to prove a compelling purpose other than moral suasion. See infra notes 119-22.
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In practice, the use of the undue burden standard presents three problems
for women who wish to exercise their right to have an abortion. First, the
undue burden standard has a disparate impact upon low-income women,
women in rural areas, women of color, and young or battered women,
because such women typically have the least resources to overcome the
procedural hurdles tolerated under the undue burden standard. 3 Second,
several lower courts across the United States have denied facial challenges
to newly enacted abortion regulations simply because the regulations mirror
those in Casey.94 The type of regulations upheld in Casey, however, may
create a greater burden on certain women depending upon the availability
of abortion services in a particular location.95 Thus, the regulation may
93. See Benshoof, supra note 4, at 2249-50. Benshoof noted the cumulative effects of the
procedural hurdles surrounding abortion: (1) an impression of state disapproval; (2) health risks and
increased travelling costs resulting from the 24-hour delay; (3) increased abortion costs resulting from
mandatory physician counseling; (4) extended exposure to harassment at clinics resulting from the 24-
hour delay requirement; (5) delays for minors resulting from court procedures; (6) time lost and extra
costs imposed on parents who accompany a minor to an informed consent session; and (7) negative
doctor publicity and harassment resulting from state reporting requirements. Id.
The undue burden standard presents the danger that courts may not fully consider such cumulative
effects, because the standard allows courts to consider obstacles to abortion one at a time. Taken as a
whole, however, these obstacles will prevent many women from obtaining abortions, and thus will
constitute an undue burden upon the right to have an abortion. See Abortion Decisions, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
21, 1992, at 5.
Some commentators argue that Casey will have a particularly harsh impact on minors who seek an
abortion. Although the Casey Court struck down a spousal consent requirement, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-31,
the Court's reasons for finding that spousal consent constitutes an undue burden should apply equally
to minors. See Benshoof, supra note 4, at 2249. Many minors face the same sort of domestic abuse
confronted by adult women; yet, the effects of a consent requirement may burden minors more. Id.; see
also The Supreme Court, 1991 Term Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REv. 163, 201-10 (1992). Domestic
abuse often has a more devastating effect on minors than on adult women, because minors will
encounter more developmental setbacks from the abuse, and they have lower occupational skills and
depend more Qn their parents for financial support. Id. at 207. Moreover, if a minor is denied an
abortion, intergenerational poverty and its related social effects likely will be perpetuated. Id. at 207.
The judicial bypass procedure does not solve these problems because it also creates fear, trauma,
expense, and delays. Id.; see, eg., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 441-44 (1990) (recounting
testimony of teens' trauma and judges' disapproval of the judicial bypass procedure).
94. See, e.g., Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993);
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992). However, Justices
O'Connor, Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens have each separately indicated that they disapprove of this
approach. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909, 911 (1994)
(Souter, J.) (denying stay of Third Circuit's refusal to reopen record on facial constitutional challenge:
"[L]itigants are free to challenge similar restrictions in other jurisdictions.); Fargo Womens Health Org.
v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Souter, J.); Id. at 1669
(Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. For example, Pennsylvania has thirteen abortion clinics and dozens more doctors who perform
abortions, while North Dakota's sole abortion doctor performs abortions only on a part-time basis. A
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actually create an undue burden, stopping some women from choosing to
have an abortion, at least until challengers gather enough evidence for an
as-applied challenge. 96 Finally, the undue burden standard will likely
change with the varying political composition of a court because the
standard falls subject to a wide range of possible interpretations.97
Justice Removes the Last Barrier to Pennsylvania's Limits on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1994, at
A8.
96. When lower courts do not allow challengers to present evidence showing that a Casey-like
statute presents, on its face, an undue burden in their particular region, the challengers must then wait
to gather evidence of the statute's impact. In the interim, if the statute actually does create an undue
burden, many women will be denied their constitutional right to decide whether to have an abortion.
Thus, the courts' evidentiary requirement will cause a complete denial of the right to choose an abortion
without undue burden. Although the requirement of an "as applied" challenge may appear merely
procedural, in fact, it drastically limits constitutional review of abortion regulations.
97. A major problem with the undue burden standard lies in its "rootless" nature. See Casey, 112
S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Anti-abortion
activists plan to push for the most restrictive laws possible in states with the best prospects for such
laws passing under the undue burden standard. Rorie Sherman, The War to Heat Up: Anti-Abortion
Activists Are Going to Reignite the Battles in the States, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 30, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter
Sherman, The War to Heat Up]; Rorie Sherman, Focus on Abortion War Shifts to the States, NAT'L
L.J, Apr. 19, 1993, at 10. Because the undue burden standard requires an intensely fact-bound, local
appraisal of abortion restrictions, courts will have substantial power to decide whether a particular
regulation constitutes an undue burden. See Pamela S. Karlan, Individual Rights Upheld, NAT'L L.L,
Aug. 31, 1992, at 12. In addition, the Supreme Court's current "fragile" composition creates uncertainty
about whether the Court would uphold a state regulation which differs from those upheld in Casey. See
Sherman, The War to Heat Up, supra, at 12. Rachel Pine of the Center for Reproductive Law and
Policy predicts that, eventually, all new anti-abortion regulations will come before the Court one at a
time. Id.
One commentator's solution to the effects of the new undue burden standard includes the following:
increasing the number of physicians providing abortions; increasing the number of medical schools that
teach abortions; encouraging more frequent discussion of abortion in medical journals and at meetings;
forming a medical providers' lobby for abortion; and expanding the class of abortion providers to
include nurse-practitioners, midwives, and physicians' assistants. See Benshoof, supra note 4, at 2249.
Another solution involves seeking redress under state constitutions. For example, the California
Supreme Court has consistently construed the right to privacy granted by the California Constitution
as broader than the federal right to privacy. See Planned Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo v. Williams, 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 546 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing several California Supreme Court decisions and applying
strict scrutiny after Casey), aft'd, 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal.), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994) (remanding for
further consideration of First Amendment issues in light of Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,
114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994)); Commission to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Meyers, 625 P.2d 779, 798
(Cal. 1981) (holding that government restrictions on abortion funding violate a woman's right to decide
whether to have an abortion "uncoerced by governmental intrusion"). Justice Brennan argued for
increased reliance on state constitutions, by litigants and the judiciary, in his 1977 Harvard Law Review
article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
Currently, ten states have constitutions which explicitly protect privacy. Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights
in State Constitutions: Models for illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 296 n.14 (citing constitutions
of Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina, Alaska, California, Montana, Hawaii, Florida, Washington, and
Arizona).
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2. Fundamental Rights
The authors of the joint opinion in Casey probably did not intend for
courts to apply the undue burden standard in nonabortion fundamental
rights cases.9" However, the reasoning that supported the undue burden
standard in Casey applies equally to nonabortion fundamental rights.99
Furthermore, the undue burden standard provides a tempting escape route
for a judge who wants to avoid applying strict scrutiny to a state law. In
fact, courts have already adapted the undue burden standard to cases
involving nonabortion fundamental rights,"° including the right to
parent,"°1 the right to die,'t 2 and the right of familial association.'0 3
In Casey, Justice Scalia warned of this expansion when he called the undue
burden standard a "quite dangerous proposition" that "places all constitu-
tional rights at risk.""'
Thus, by applying the undue burden standard rather than the standard
98. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-08. The authors of the joint opinion distinguished the right to
abortion from the Supreme Court's other recognized privacy rights. Id. at 2807. The authors stated:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education ....
... These considerations begin our analysis... but cannot end it, for this reason:
[a]bortion is a unique act.., the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law.
Id.
99. Take, for example, the fundamental right to raise one's child as one sees fit, see, e.g., Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923) (recognizing the fundamental parental right to "establish a home
and bring up children"), and a hypothetical state law through which a state attempts to persuade parents
to send their children to public schools. Under the law, before parents may send their children to private
schools, they must complete the following requirements: (1) a detailed application explaining their
choice; (2) a one-year waiting period to encourage a carefully deliberated choice; (3) counseling
sessions to discuss the benefits of public schools; and (4) submission of the child's complete educational
records to the state. Although the state regulation may "inhibit" the right to raise one's child as one sees
fit, a court could easily find that each procedure, taken alone, does not rise to the level of an undue
burden.
100. See infra notes 101, 103, 209.
101. See Heradon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993) (en bane) (upholding a grandparent
visitation statute as constitutional). See also infra notes 159-93 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Herndon.
102. See infra note 209.
103. See Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding, in § 1983 suit, that police
officer and social worker did not unduly burden plaintiff's right to familial association in conducting
child abuse investigation); see also Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 650, 653
(Cal. 1994) (using Casey to justify the nonapplication of strict scrutiny in a privacy case).
104. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2878 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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used by the Third Circuit below,"0 5 the Court sparked a new method of
fundamental rights analysis. Before Casey, the Supreme Court consistently
defined fundamental rights as those that remain insulated from the
continually shifting political majority."6 The undue burden standard,
however, subtly undermines the protective barrier surrounding any
fundamental right. It allows the current political majority to actively
interfere with its citizens' exercise of their fundamental rights, so long as
such interference does not amount to an undue burden. Because it allows
such interference, the undue burden standard appears irreconcilable with
traditional fundamental rights protection.
IV. PROPOSAL-MODIFICATION OF THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD TO
INCLUDE A SOCIAL MEANING TEST
The main problem with the Casey undue burden standard lies in its
potential to slowly chip away at fundamental rights protection.107 This
problem does not necessarily stem from the quantity of the infringement
allowed under the standard."0 8 Rather, the problem lies in the test's failure
to guarantee a finding of an undue burden when a state enacts a law
designed to discourage people from exercising their fundamental rights.0 9
105. See Peterson, supra note 7. Peterson argued that the Third Circuit used the correct standard
of review after applying the two rules of Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977): "(1) a legal
standard ceases to become law when a majority of the court does not apply it; and (2) the narrowest
concurring opinion becomes the law when the court issues a splintered decision." Peterson, supra note
7, at 297-310.
106. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990) ("[T]he regulation of constitutionally
protected decisions... must be predicated on legitimate state concerns other than the disagreement with
the choice the individual has made .... Otherwise, the interest in liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause would be a nullity.') (citations omitted); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 638 (1943) ('One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.").
107. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
108. If properly applied, the undue burden test would allow only an indirect or de minimis burden
on the exercise of a fundamental right. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("I agree, indeed I have forcefully argued, that a law of general
applicability which places only an incidental burden on a fundamental right does not infringe upon that
right .... .'); id. at 2847 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) ("To say that restrictions on a right are subject to strict scrutiny is not to say that the
right is absolute. Regulations can be upheld if they have no significant impact ....").
109. Supreme Court justices have repeatedly warned that a state may not use its coercive powers
to discourage the exercise of the right to abortion. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 540 n.l (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Missouri has brought
to bear the full force of its economic power and control over essential facilities to discourage its citizens
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To solve this problem, a court using the undue burden standard should
modify the analysis outlined by Justice O'Connor. In addition to consider-
ing the extent to which a state regulation infinges upon a fundamental
right, courts should examine the social meaning of the state regulation.
Under this modified undue burden standard, a court will examine the
regulation under strict scrutiny for either of two reasons: if an impermissi-
ble amount of interference with a fundamental right exists or if the
regulation reflects a state attempt to achieve moral conformity."'
A. Lawmakers May Not Attempt to Foster Moral Conformity
Legislative acts motivated by racial bias,"' gender bias,"' religious
from exercising their constitutional rights... .'); Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) ("[This is] nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the
Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue
between the woman and her physician."); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416, 444 (1983) ("[A] state may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of
abortions."); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 330 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[]The state must
refrain from wielding its enormous power and influence in a manner that might burden the... freedom
to choose . .. .'); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385 (1978) (disapproving of the fact that
"[people] will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to many").
110. Several states currently employ a similar principle of neutrality based upon the privacy right
established in their state constitutions. See Katheryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
1151 (1993). For example, in Moe v. Secretary of Administration and Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass.
1981), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the state must act impartially when it distributes
Medicaid benefits that affect fundamental rights. Id. at 402. The court stated: "[O]nce [the state] chooses
to enter the constitutionally protected area of choice, it must do so with genuine indifference .... [I]n
this area, government is not free to 'achieve with carrots what [it] is forbidden to achieve with sticks."'
Id. (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTmIIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 933 n.77 (1978)).
111. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding statute unconstitutional even
though racially motivated drafting occurred eighty years earlier); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879) (striking down law barring black men from jury duty); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980) (extending discriminatory purpose test to the Fifteenth Amendment); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (suggesting evidentiary sources for
discriminatory intent); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) ("[Ihe invidious quality of a law
ultimately must be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.").
112. See, eag., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding state all-
female nursing school unconstitutional as based on stereotypes about gender in, nursing); Personnel
Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding a veterans' preference in civil
service jobs because decisionmaker had no discriminatory purpose); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (holding unconstitutional statute prohibiting the sale of beer to underage males only); Weinberger
v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating Social Security Act provision giving survivor's
benefits to females only); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional
dependency presumption for female spouses only); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating
Idaho law preferring males as estate administrators).
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bias," 3 or the desire to harm a politically unpopular group114 are not
constitutionally acceptable. Such motivation violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" 5 and the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment." 6 Likewise, moral bias
may not motivate legislative acts which affect fundamental rights. Such
moral motivation violates the fundamental right to privacy"' grounded
in various sections of the Constitution."'
113. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down Alabama law mandating a
period of silence for prayer or meditation); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (striking
down Kentucky statute requiring posting of Ten Commandments in every public school classroom);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (establishing secular purpose requirement for state
action); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding that absence of secular purpose for statute
prohibiting teaching of evolution constitutes violation of Establishment Clause).
114. See United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973) ("[Ilf the constitutional
conception of the 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.").
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
117. The doctrine of privacy includes both an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" and an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). The right to make certain important decisions means that the state
may not homogenize the beliefs and attitudes of its citizens. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-
54 (1973) (defining the abortion decision as included in the right to privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66
(1969) (noting that state attempt to "control the moral content of a person's thoughts" violates the right
to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965) (establishing privacy right of married
couple to decide whether to bear a child); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (noting
that a state may not "standardize its children," for a child is not "the mere creature of the state"); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (noting that a state may not attempt to "foster a homogenous
people"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[The framers
of the Constitution] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone... ).
For recent discussions of the right to privacy, see Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold,
16 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 511 (1989); Ken Gormly, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV.
1335; Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Substantive Due Process and the Lockean Liberal Tradition: Rethinking
the Modern Privacy Cases, 65 IND. LJ. 723 (1990); Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy., 3
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119 (1992); Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold. Foucauldian &
Republican Approaches to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 861 (1991); David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence
of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 975 (1992).
118. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (grounding privacy in "liberty" protected by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (grounding privacy
in the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments); id. at 486-89 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (grounding privacy in the Ninth Amendment).
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Under traditional fundamental rights analysis," 9 courts applying strict
scrutiny usually invalidate laws motivated by the desire for moral
conformity. Once a court finds that a legislative act affects a fundamental
right, the state must demonstrate a "compelling" purpose for the act. °2 1
Morality does not constitute a compelling purpose.12 ' Therefore, the state
119. See supra note 11 for a discussion of traditional fundamental rights analysis.
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
121. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that morality does not constitute a
compelling purpose, the Court has implicitly supported this conclusion in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
In Loving, the Court struck down a Virginia anti-miscegenation statute as violative of the
findamental right to marry. 388 U.S. at 12. Virginia offered the following purposes for the statute: "'to
preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent the 'corruption of blood,' a 'mongrel breed
of citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride."' Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.
1955)). The trial judge upheld the law on the grounds that:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on
separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no
cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend
for the races to mix.
Id. at 3. The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the statute and found that the state failed to offer
an "overriding purpose" to justify the statute. Id. at 11.
In Stanley, the Court struck down a Georgia law prohibiting the private possession of obscene
matter. 394 U.S. at 565-66. The Court recognized the plaintiff's First Amendment right to receive
information and ideas and his Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. Id. at 564-65. The Court found
uncompelling Georgia's interest in "control[ling] the moral content of a person's thoughts." Id. at 565-
66.
Finally, in Roe, the Court struck down a Texas statute prohibiting abortion as violating the right to
privacy. 410 U.S. at 163-64. Texas asserted an interest in protecting prenatal life based on a theory that
human life begins at the moment of conception. Id. at 159. The Court refused to accept this assertion
as a valid state interest: "When those trained in the respective disciplines ofmedicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary. . . is not in a position to speculate as to
the answer." Id Instead, the Court recognized Texas' interest in potential life only after viability, on
the basis of "logical and biological" justifications. Id. at 163.
-Several lower courts have explicitly held that morality does not constitute a "compelling purpose."
See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 730 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[E]qual protection doctrine
does not permit notions of majoritarian morality to serve as compelling justification for laws that
discriminate. . . .'), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1145 (N.D.
Tex. 1982) ("But even if there is widespread public distaste (for homosexuality], this would not be...
a 'compelling state interest' to justify a denial of the right of privacy."), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022
(1986); Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975) ("The State's unarticulated position on the
morality of abortion cannot be considered a compelling state interest .... .'), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981), the court stated:
[]t is not the function of the Penal Law in our governmental policy to provide either a
medium for the articulation or the apparatus for the intended enforcement of moral or
theological values .... The community and its members are entirely free to employ
theological teaching, moral suasion, parental advice, psychological and psychiatric counseling
and other non-coercive means to condemn the practice ofconsensual sodomy .... [But] [t]he
316
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must prove that the legislature acted upon a morally neutral motive.122
Thus, within the realm of fundamental rights,'1 the "compelling" purpose
requirement provides a necessary check on legislative motives. In contrast,
under the Casey undue burden standard, a state may avoid this strict
appraisal of its legislative motive 4 As long as a law does not create an
undue burden on the exercise of a fundamental right, the law can
permissibly coerce people into conforming to the majoritarian morality."z
This tolerance of state-mandated morality contradicts the theoretical basis
underlying fundamental rights for two reasons. First, by definition,
fundamental rights consist of those rights which "may not be submitted to
vote" and which "depend on the outcome of no elections." '26 The undue
burden standard, however, submits the exercise of fundamental rights to the
current political majority. Second, the traditional requirement that a state
remain morally neutral when addressing fundamental rights should not vary
according to the amount of interference with a fundamental right. Certainly
the requirement that a state remain neutral with respect to race, gender,
religion, and politics 27 does not suddenly disappear if a law affects only
a small number of people in a limited way. Accordingly, the requirement
narrow question before us is whether the Federal Constitution permits the use of the criminal
law for that purpose.
Id. at 940 n.3.
122. For commentators arguing similarly, see Ronald Dworkin, UnenumeratedRights: Whether and
How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. Cm. L. RE,. 381 (1992) (arguing that, while a state may
encourage moral responsibility, it may not enforce moral conformity); Louis Henkin, Morals and the
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963) (arguing that (1) "morals"
legislation has no place in rational, utilitarian government; and (2) "morals" legislation violates the
Establishment Clause); Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L. REV.
405 (1988) (arguing that morality does not constitute a compelling interest which overrides parental
rights); D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U.
ILu. L. REv. 67 (arguing that morality should not constitute a legitimate or compelling purpose for state
action). But cf Michael J. Perry, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976) (arguing that a state may promote public
morality so long as the contemporary culture views the moral issue as public in nature).
123. This discussion of moral neutrality does not apply to mere nonfundamental "liberty interests,"
because the Supreme Court recognizes morality as a "legitimate" state purpose. See Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy statute as justified by state
interest in public morality).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92 for a discussion of the Casey undue burden standard.
If a court does not find an undue burden, then the court will apply rational basis review. Under rational
basis review, the state need only justify its act with a "legitimate" purpose.
125. Because morality does constitute a "legitimate" purpose, see supra note 121, statutes which
do not create an undue burden allow the state to pursue moral conformity.
126. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
127. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement of
neutrality.
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that a state remain morally neutral should not disappear because a law
creates only a small burden on the exercise of a fundamental right.
B. The Social Meaning Test
In order to ensure state neutrality, the undue burden standard should
include an examination into the motivation behind any legislative act that
affects a fundamental right. Motivation analysis plays an important part in
our jurisprudence. The Supreme Court regularly employs motivation
analysis in cases involving the Establishment Clause,' race discrimina-
tion,129 and gender discrimination. 3 Furthermore, motivation analysis
provides a necessary check on the abuse of legislative power. The judicial
invalidation of a law sends a warning signal that may convince a legislature
to abandon a law completely.13' Finally, upholding a law that carries an
illicit motive merely legitimizes the legislature's disguised attempt to curtail
fundamental rights. 132
To ascertain legislative motive, a court can look either to the subjective
intent of the legislature 3 3 or to the objective message that a legislative
128. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down an Alabama school prayer and
meditation statute); Lynch v. Donelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding City of Pawtucket's display of
Christmas creche).
129. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(upholding a governmental zoning decision because challengers failed to show racially discriminatory
intent).
130. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 420 U.S. 199 (1977) (striking down federal statute because
Court found it to be motivated by Congress' discriminatory stereotypes).
131. See Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact andillicit Motive: Theories of Constitutlonal
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 116 (1977).
132. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEwdcm CONSTTUIONAL LAW 822-23 (2d. ed. 1988) (noting that
validating such a law would "serve to legitimate a transparent and potentially chilling abridgment of
individual liberty"). Commentators criticize motivation analysis on several grounds. First, commentators
argue that it is too difficult to ascertain legislative motives. Second, commentators argue that even if
such motives are discovered, invalidation of a law is futile because lawmakers can simply pass similar
legislation. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.. 1212-17 (1970). This Note proposes a modified undue burden standard that answers these
two grounds of criticism. The proposed test incorporates a social meaning test, which should more
accurately assess legislative motives. Further, because the proposed test does not give any weight to the
stated purpose of a law, lawmakers should find it difficult to mask a similar law with a new, contrived
purpose.
Commentators also argue that disutility results from invalidating a statute that might have other,
legitimate uses. Id. This Note proposes that the benefit of invalidating a statute that affects fundamental
rights and reflects moral coercion outweighs the administrative difficulty of reenacting those parts of
a statute which are morally neutral.
133. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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act sends to the citizens of the state.'34 The first approach proves difficult
for two reasons. First, a court must conduct an inquiry into the surrounding
circumstances of a legislative act for often elusive evidence of any
improper motive."3 5 Second, a legislature may simply conceal its actual
motive by articulating a permissible alternative motive.'36
The second approach to ascertaining legislative motives, which Professor
Laurence Tribe calls the "social meaning" test,'37 offers greater ease and
more consistent results. This test considers the view of an objective
observer familiar with the legislative history and application of the
statute. 3 ' If that observer would perceive a legislative act as conveying
an improper message or motive, then the act violates the Constitution.!
Thus, the social meaning test prevents the legislature from concealing illicit
motives behind contrived but permissible ones.
C. A Modified Undue Burden Standard
Courts applying the undue burden standard should incorporate the social
meaning test as a second step of analysis to determine whether a law
reflects moral neutrality. Thus, where a legislative act affects a fundamental
right, a court employing the modified undue burden standard would ask
two questions. First, does the state's act create a substantial obstacle to the
exercise of the fundamental right? Second, would the reasonably well-
informed observer perceive the act as endorsing or disapproving of the
134. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also TRIBE,
supra note 132, at 820-21.
135. In Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68, the Court identified six potential sources of evidence
of discnminatory intent: (1) historical background, (2) specific sequence of events leading up to the act;
(3) departures from normal procedure; (4) departures from normal substance; (5) legislative or
administrative history; and (6) testimony of individual legislators. Id.
136. See id. at 270-71 n.21. The legislature may show that it would have taken the same action
notwithstanding the improper motive. Id. This allows the legislature, in afterthought, to conjure up a
valid motive.
137. See TRIBE, supra note 132, at 820.
138. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The relevant issue
is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history and implementation of the
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement ... ."); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (reiterating Wallace test); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 147 (1981) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("Respondents are being sent a clear, though sophisticated, message that because of their
race, they are to stay out of [an] all-white enclave . . . ."); see also Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987)
(advocating the social meaning test in equal protection cases involving race).
139. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (noting that government attempt to convey message of
religious preference violates the religious liberty of nonadherents).
1995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
320 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 73:295
exercise of the fundamental right? If the court answers "yes" to either
prong of this modified test, the act would constitute an undue burden.
This approach acknowledges that a state has certain value-neutral
interests which may require a slight infringement upon a fundamental right.
However, at the same time, it prevents the state from using the undue
burden standard as a means to abrogate its citizens' exercise of their
fundamental rights.'40
V. APPLICATION OF THE MODIFIED UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD:
THREE EXAMPLES
A. Abortion
In Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania,141 the
Supreme Court upheld an abortion regulation including an informed consent
requirement and a twenty-four-hour waiting period requirement.1
42
Although the provisions survived under the undue burden standard applied
in Casey,43 the same provisions probably would not survive under the
modified undue burden standard outlined above.1"
1. The Informed Consent Requirement
Section 3205(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania penal code requires a physician
to inform a woman of the medical risks of abortion and childbirth and of
the probable gestational age of the unborn child. 14  Section 3205(a)(2)
140. The requirement that a state remain morally neutral does not necessarily mean that a state may
not encourage an atmosphere of moral responsibility. See Dworkin, supra note 122. Dworkin argues
that while states may maintain a moral environment in which people take decisions about life, death,
and abortion seriously, a state may not enforce a majoritarian view about the sanctity of human life. Id.
at 426-28. However, he 'also expresses concern about the fine line between the legitimate goal of
promoting responsibility and "the illegitimate goal of coercion." Id. at 432. The modified undue burden
test would permit suggestions of moral responsibility, but not moral coercion. Under the test, a state
can achieve neutrality and promote responsibility by communicating the strong arguments on both sides
of a moral debate.
141. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). See supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion
of Casey.
142. 112 S. Ct. at 2821-26.
143. See supra Part ll.A.
144. See supra Part P1.C.
145. Section 3205(a)(1) provides:
(a) General rule.-No abortion shall be performed or induced except with the voluntary and
informed consent of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed or induced.
Except in the case of a medical emergency, consent to an abortion is voluntary and informed
if and only if:
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requires a physician to inform the woman about potential child support and
medical benefits available to her should she choose to carry the pregnancy
to term, and to offer the woman printed materials from the Pennsylvania
Department of Health."4 The materials include: detailed information
about agencies which provide pregnancy, childbirth, and adoption
assistance; the number for a twenty-four-hour hotline to call for assistance
in locating an agency; and pictures of the probable anatomical and
physiological characteristics of a fetus from the moment of conception. 47
Using the original undue burden standard, the authors of the Casey joint
opinion found both sections of the informed consent provision constitution-
al.'" The joint opinion found that, in general, the provisions gave
truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature and risks of the
abortion procedure. 49 The joint opinion admitted that the Health Depart-
ment materials displayed a state preference for childbirth, but found such
a preference permissible 5 ' because it did not deprive a woman of the
ultimate abortion decision.15'
(1) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to perform the abortion
or the referring physician has orally informed the woman of:
(i) The nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and
alternatives to the procedure or treatment that a reasonable patient would consider
material to the decision of whether or not to undergo the abortion.
(ii) The probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to be
performed.
(iii) The medical risks associated with carrying her child to term.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. AxN. § 3205(aX) (Supp. 1993).
146. Section 3205(a)(2) provides:
(2) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to perform the abortion or
the referring physician, or a qualified physician assistant, health care practitioner, technician
or social worker to whom the responsibility has been delegated by either physician, has
informed the pregnant woman that:
(i) The department publishes printed materials which describe the unborn child and list
agencies which offer alternatives to abortion and that she has a right to review the
printed materials and that a copy will be provided to her free of charge if she chooses
to review it.
(ii) Medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, childbirth and
neonatal care, and that more detailed information on the availability of such assistance
is contained in the printed materials published by the department.
(iii) The father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of her child, even
in instances where he has offered to pay for the abortion. In the case of rape, this
information may be omitted. ...
18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3205(aX2) (Supp. 1993).
147. See id. § 3208(a) (Supp. 1993).
148. 112 S. Ct. at 2821-25.
149. Id. at 2823.
150. Id. at 2823-24.
151. Id. at 2819.
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Under the modified undue burden standard, only section 3205(a)(1) of
the informed consent provision would be upheld as constitutional. Applying
the first prong of the modified undue burden standard, a court would find,
as did the Casey court,'52 that the regulation does not create an impermis-
sible amount of interference with the right to have an abortion. The
provision involves the receipt of information rather than an economic or
physical barrier to abortion. Although the information may make a woman
feel pressure from the state not to have an abortion, it probably will not
alter her decision. Thus, the provision probably does not create an undue
amount of interference with the right to abortion.
Applying the second prong of the standard, a court would ask whether
the reasonably well-informed, objective observer would view the provision
as endorsing or disapproving of abortion? A court would probably find that
section 3205(a)(1)113 reflects a position of neutrality towards the abortion
decision, and, therefore, a value-neutral interest in the health of the mother,
because the required information parallels other medical informed consent
provisions. On the other hand, a court would probably find that section
3205(a)(2) 154 reflects state disapproval of abortion. The second provision
requires distribution of detailed information about childbirth benefits and
assistance and, through pictures, implicitly reflects a theory that life begins
at conception. In order to demonstrate a more neutral position than this, a
state could offer additional information about the benefits of abortion for
a woman in emotional, physical, or financial distress and about the absence
of certain human characteristics in a fetus. Section 3205(a)(2) does not
offer such balanced information. Thus, because a reasonable observer
would probably perceive the informed consent provision as disapproving
of abortion, a court would find that section 3205(a)(2) imposes an undue
burden on a woman seeking to undergo an abortion.
2. The Twenty-Four-Hour Waiting Period
Sections 3205(a)(1) and (a)(2) also require a physician to provide
informed consent counseling at least twenty-four hours before the abortion
procedure. This requirement means that a woman must make two trips to
an abortion clinic.155 Under the Casey undue burden standard, a court
152. Id. at 2825-26.
153. See supra note 145 for the text of section 3205(a)(1).
154. See supra note 146 for the text of section 3205(a)(2).
155. The New York Times recently reported that some abortion clinics in Pennsylvania have begun
using taped messages played to women over the telephone to meet the twenty-four-hour requirement.
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might find that the twenty-four-hour delay creates an undue burden because
a woman may incur additional financial and time costs, as well as twice the
emotional trauma resulting from harassment by protestors at the abortion
clinic.'56 Indeed, in Casey, the joint opinion acknowledged that the
twenty-four-hour requirement presents a "closer question" than does the
informed consent provision.'57 Nonetheless, the Casey Court found that
the state may persuade a woman to choose childbirth by imposing upon her
such additional costs and mental suffering. 158
Under the modified undue burden standard, however, a court would ask
a second question: Would the reasonably well-informed, objective observer
view the delay as either encouraging or discouraging abortion? An observer
might view the delay as neutral because it gives a woman more time to
think through her decision. However, the observer might also question why
the state does not require such a delay before other medical procedures,
especially those which involve serious or life-threatening risks. Based on
the additional costs to women seeking abortions and the risks of harassment
by abortion protestors, as well as the state's unique treatment of the
abortion procedure, the reasonable observer would probably conclude that
the delay requirement reflects the state's disapproval of abortions. Thus, the
court would find that the twenty-four-hour delay provision creates an undue
burden as defined by the modified test.
B. Grandparent Visitation Statutes
In Herndon v. Tuhey, 159 the Supreme Court of Missouri extended the
undue burden standard to the family law context 60 to uphold a grandpar-
ent visitation statute as constitutional.' 6' Due to the high divorce rate and
the increased political power of the elderly, most states have enacted some
form of grandparent visitation statute. 62 Grandparent visitation statutes
Although this strategy does meet the letter of Pennsylvania's abortion regulation, abortion opponents
have already raised claims that this does not comply with "the spirit of the law." Pennsylvania Abortion
Foes Say Law Is Being Undermined, N.Y. TIMms, Sept. 26, 1994, at A14.
156. See supra note 93 for a discussion of the procedural hurdles confronting a woman seeking an
abortion.
157. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
158. Id. at 2825-26.
159. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
160. Id. at 208-09.
161, Id. at 210.
162. See Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Visitation
Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 119-22 (1986). For more discussion of grandparent visitation statutes,
see Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 J. FAM. L. 393 (1985);
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provide a mechanism for grandparents to compel visitation with their
grandchildren against parents' wishes.'63 Thus, the statutes give rise to a
conflict between the childrearing interests of a parent and the police power
of the state.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that parents have a
fundamental right to raise their children as they deem appropriate.'"
However, the Court also acknowledges a state's countervailing parens
patriae power to intervene in the parent-child relationship when necessary
to protect the welfare of the child. 6' Traditionally, before a state may
invoke theparenspatriae power, the state must make a showing of neglect
or harm to a child.'66 A state may not intervene merely because it
disagrees with a parent's particular childrearing decision. 67
In compliance with the parens patriae requirement of harm, many
grandparent visitation statutes allow compelled visitation only in a narrow
set of circumstances, such as the death or divorce of a child's parents.
68
Edward M. Bums, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Is It Time for the Pendulum to Fall? 25 FAM. L.Q.
59 (1991); Samuel V. Schoonmaker et al., Constitutional Issues Raised by Third-Party Access to
Children, 25 FAM. L.Q. 95 (1991).
163. See Shandling, supra note 162, at 118.
164. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a statute
forbidding children to learn German because it violated a parent's right to "establish a home and bring
up children'); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding unconstitutional a statute
requiring public education for all children because it unreasonably interfered with the right of parents
and guardians to direct the development of their children); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499
(1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down a zoning statute because it limited a family's right of self-
definition).
The Court applies strict scrutiny when examining statutes that infringe upon the fundamental right
to raise children. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)) ("[W]hen the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements,
this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent
to which they are served by the challenged regulation.').
165. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1198-1202 (1979-1980) (discussing the origin and uses of the parenspatrlae power).
166. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-51 (1972); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (stating that
"[mI]ere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful'); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944) (stating that legislation falls within the state's police power
if "appropriately designed to reach [the state's concerns]"; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230
(1972) ("This case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child
... has been demonstrated ....').
167. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-34 (discussing and rejecting the state's argument that it could use
its parens patrie power to force Amish children to attend public school against their parents' wishes,
where no showing of harm to children was shown); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 ("That the State may do
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally, and
morally, is clear, but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.').
168. See Shandling, supra note 162, at 119-20.
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A statute which does not require a showing of harm may violate a parent's
fundamental right to raise a child as that parent sees fit. For instance, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee recently held that the application of a
grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional where both parents
maintained continuous custody of their child and were generally capable as
parents. 16
9
In Herndon v. Tuhey, 170 the Supreme Court of Missouri used the undue
burden standard to uphold a grandparent visitation statute. Herndon resulted
from an ongoing dispute between Ann and Randy Tuhey and Robert and
Sara Hemdon-the parents and grandparents, respectively, of a child named
Cody.17' Prior to the dispute, Randy Tuhey worked for the Hemdons and
Cody spent a substantial amount of time with his grandparents. 72 These
relations eventually deteriorated and a family feud ensued.173 After a
series of family conflicts and lawsuits, the Hemdons sued to establish
visitation rights with Cody."74 The Hemdons sued under Missouri's
grandparent visitation statute, 75 which allows visitation when a child
resides with intact and capable parents if the visitation serves the "best
interests of the child."
76
169. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). Tennessee's grandparent visitation statute
allowed visitation based only on the court's determination ofthe "best interests of the child." Id. at 576;
see also id. at 582. In striking down the statute, the Hawk court frequently cited federal constitutional
law, id. at 578-81, but ultimately invoked the privacy right in Article I, § 8 of the Tennessee
Constitution to invalidate application of the statute to the circumstances presented in Hawk. Id. at 582.
Applying strict scrutiny, the court found that "without [some showing of] a substantial danger of harm
to the child, a court may not constitutionally impose its own subjective notions of the 'best interests
of the child."' Id. at 579.
But see King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992), where the
court recognized a fundamental right of grandparents to visit their grandchildren. The Kentucky
Supreme Court weighed the constitutional rights of the grandparent, the parents, and the child in
upholding a statute similar to those in Hawk and Herndon. Id. at 632. The dissent in King took issue
with the notion that grandparents have a fundamental right to visit their grandchildren. Justice Lambert
argued, "None would seriously argue ... that the state possesses the power to redistribute the infant
population in such a manner simply because of its perception that a child would be better off
somewhere else." Id. at 634 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
170. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
171. 1d. at 205.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 206.
175. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.402 (Supp. 1992).
176. Section 452.402 provides:
I, The court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparents of the child and issue
any necessary orders to enforce the decree. The court may grant grandparent visitation when
... (3) a grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation with the child for a period exceeding
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In deciding the case, the Herndon court recognized both the parents'
fundamental right of childrearing and the state's right to interfere in the
parent-child relationship.Y7 Rather than applying strict scrutiny based on
the presence of the fundamental right,178 the court applied the undue
burden standard.' 79 The court found that, even in the absence of harm to a
child, the statute did not impose a "substantial encroachment" on the
fundamental right of parenting. 8' Thus, the court upheld the statute as
constitutional. 8'
The Herndon decision allowed the state to intrude upon the fundamental
right of childrearing where the state disagreed with the parental decision to
deny grandparent visitation. Had the court used strict scrutiny rather than
the undue burden standard, the state would have had to justify the intrusion
with a showing of harm to the child.'82 Instead, the undue burden
standard enabled the state to avoid this requirement.'83 The burden shifted
to the Tuheys to show that the statute unduly burdened their parenting rights.' 4
90 days.
2. The court shall determine if the visitation by the grandparent would be in the child's best
interests or if it would endanger the child's physical health or impair his emotional
development. Visitation may only be ordered when the court finds such visitation to be in the
best interests of the child. The court may order reasonable conditions or restrictions on
grandparent visitation.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.402 (Supp. 1992).
177. 857 S.W.2d at 207.
178. Under strict scrutiny, Missouri could justify the statute only by showing that it prevents harm
to a child. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of harm).
179. 857 S.W.2d at 208. The court found authority for the standard in Zablockl, 434 U.S. 374
(1978), the reasoning in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Akron I, 462 U.S. 416,452-66 (1983), and Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
180. 857 S.W.2d at 209. The court distinguished the intrusion of grandparent visitation on parenting
decisions from other, more serious intrusions. Id. According to the court, more serious intrusions occur
where the state dictates what school a child must attend or what language a child must learn, or if the
state prohibits certain family members from living together based on an unreasonable definition of a
family. Id.
The trial court granted extensive visitation to the Hemdons, including two Saturdays per month with
one overnight stay, five hours on Thanksgiving (or an alternate day), five hours on December 23rd and
two days over the winter holidays, and one week during the summer. Id. at 206. The court also ordered
the Tuheys to notify the Hemdons of all school, social, and athletic activities in which Cody participates
and which grandparents might want to attend. Id. The Supreme Court of Missouri found this visitation
order excessive, but maintained that the statute itself was constitutional. Id. at 210.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of harm to a child);
see also Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580-81 (discussing United States Constitution's requirement of harm to
a child before allowing state intrusion).
183. The court would apply strict scrutiny only if it found that the statute constituted an undue
burden. Because the court concluded that the statute did not constitute an undue burden, the court
applied rational basis review and upheld the statute. 857 S.W.2d at 210.
184. Id. at 208-09.
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The problem with this state intrusion lies in its interference with the
parental right to shape a child's development. " 5 Parents, grandparents,
and judges will disagree about the best moral and educational influences for
a child.'86 The fundamental right of childrearing ensures that a parent
holds the ultimate decisionmaking authority.'8 7 By forgoing the minimum
requirement of harm to a child prior to state intrusion, the state may
effectively appropriate any childrearing decision. 8
Application of the modified undue burden standard would probably
change the result in Herndon. The modified test would ask two questions:
First, does the state act create a substantial obstacle to the exercise of a
parent's fundamental right? Second, would the reasonably well-informed,
objective observer perceive the act as approving or disapproving of the
exercise of the parent's fundamental right?189 The Herndon court com-
pleted the first step in the inquiry and found that the amount of interference
caused by the visitation statute did not create an undue burden on the
Tuheys' childrearing rights.'9
Under the second step in the modified standard, however, a court would
probably find that the objective observer would perceive the statute as
projecting state disapproval of the Tuheys' exercise of their fundamental
childrearing rights. Because the statute allows state interference with the
decision of two presumably capable parents, the statute effectively vetoed
the Tuheys' parenting decision.'' The statute reflects a moral, value-
based position that grandparent visitation serves a child's best interests,
even when the child's parents object. 2 Thus, the statute would constitute
185. See cases cited supra note 164.
186. See Bean, supra note 162, at 446-47. Professor Bean argues:
Some parents and judges will not care if children are physically disciplined by the
grandparents; some parents and judges will not care if the grandparents teach children a
religion inconsistent with the parents' religion; some judges and parents will not care if the
children are exposed to or taught racist beliefs or sexist beliefs ... [b]ut some parents and
some judges will care. Between the two, the parents should be the ones to choose not to
expose their children to certain people or ideas ....
Id.
187. See cases cited supra note 164 and accompanying text.
188. See Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (stating that the requirement of harm constitutes "the sole
protection that parents have against pervasive state interference in the parenting process").
189. See supra Part IV for discussion of a modified undue burden test.
190. 857 S.W.2d at 209 (holding that the "magnitude of the infringement" did not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation).
191. See Bean, supra note 162, at 441, 445-46. Bean argues that if the state delegates to parents
the authority to raise a child as they see fit, except when the state disagrees with their parenting choices,
the delegation creates no authority. Id. at 441.
192. Had the statute provided for grandparent visitation in the event of the death or divorce of a
parent, or some other showing of harm to the child, the social meaning of the statute might change. An
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an undue burden under the second prong of the modified test, and the court
would apply strict scrutiny to the statute.193
C. The Right to Die
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,94 the United
States Supreme Court held that Missouri's "clear and convincing"
evidentiary requirement 95 did not violate an incompetent patient's 1
96
right to die."9 The Court avoided the issue of whether an incompetent
patient possesses a fundamental right to die, 98 and merely assumed that
the patient had a liberty interest in controlling the decision to withdraw life-
support mechanisms.'" The Supreme Court of Missouri found that
statements Nancy Cruzan made while competent that she would not want
to live as a "vegetable," coupled with similar testimony from her family,
did not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Nancy wanted to
die."°° Nancy would have had to appoint a surrogate decisionmaker in
order to create clear and convincing evidence of her desire to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment."1 Although Missouri's clear and convincing
observer might find that the statute merely prevents harm to the child by ensuring that each child has
a minimum level of necessary adult support. The statute would no longer appear to replace a parent's
fundamental right to raise a child as that parent deems best.
193. See discussion of strict scrutiny supra note 11.
194. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
195. The Court defined clear and convincing evidence as:
proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled
commitment to the termination of life supports under the circumstances like those presented,
[or] ... evidence which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction
as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and
weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Id. at 285 n. 11 (citations omitted).
196. The use of "incompetent" here indicates a person in a "persistent vegetative state." A person
in a persistent vegetative state "exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant
cognitive function." Id. at 266.
197. Id. at 280-82. Many variations of the right to die exist. Patients involved in right-to-die
disputes vary significantly in their level and history of competency. Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J.
Larson, Experimenting with the "Right to Die" in the Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253,
1255 (1991). Medical prognoses also evince wide variances from one right-to-die case to the next. Id.
Possible life-sustaining treatments include blood transfusions, nutrition and hydration, chemotherapy,
surgery, and a variety of other measures. Id. ("There is no 'typical' case."). The Cruzan case and this
example address only the right of an incompetent patient in a persistent vegetative state to refuse
artificial nutrition and hydration.
198. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-81.
199. Id. at 279. A court will subject state action that affects mere liberty interests to the least level
of scrutiny, rational basis review. See supra note 11 for a discussion of rational basis review.
200. 497 U.S. at 285-87.
201. Id. at 287 n.12, 289-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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evidentiary requirement created a barrier against the withdrawal of
treatment, 2 the United States Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the
requirement.2"3 The Court stated that Missouri's unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life outweighed any hardship imposed by the
requirement upon Nancy's right to die.2°4
The Cruzan decision did not settle whether an incompetent person's right
to die constitutes a fundamental right;0 5 the Court also did not apply the
undue burden standard to such a right. Nonetheless, the Cruzan case
presents an excellent factual situation with which to demonstrate the utility
of the modified undue burden standard in the right-to-die context. In fact,
such a hypothetical case may well arise. Many states currently recognize
the right to die as fundamental.2" Such states usually ground the funda-
mental right to die in the right to privacy guaranteed by the federal
Constitution20 7 or the state's own constitution. 8 Furthermore, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, a
Michigan circuit court, and several Michigan Supreme and Appeals Court
justices have already applied the Casey undue burden standard in right-to-
die cases addressing the issue of assisted suicide.2"
202. See supra note 195 for the definition of clear and convincing evidence.
203. 497 U.S. at 286-87.
204, Id. at 280-82.
205. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976) (recognizing a right to die in the United States Constitution's right to privacy).
207. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584-86 (D.R.I. 1988); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr.,
426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ohio C.P. 1980); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del. Ch. 1980); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of BeIchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663-64. But cf Thomas W. Mayo,
Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die," 49 MD. L. REV. 103 (1990) (arguing against creating a
fundamental right to die).
208. See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682
(Ariz. 1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137 (1986); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d
716, 722 (Ga. 1984); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1983).
209. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1462-64 (W.D. Wash.
1994); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 746 (Mich. 1994) (dissenting opinions of Justices Levin
and Mallett); Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 499 (Mich. App. 1994) (dissenting opinion
of Judge Shelton); Hobbins v. Atty. General, No. 93-306-178CZ, 1993 WL 276833, at *9 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1993).
In these cases, those judges and justices who applied the undue burden standard had an easy analysis
because the statutes at issue completely prohibited assisted suicide. Therefore, they quickly found that
the statutes constituted an undue burden. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1465; Kevorkian,
527 N.W.2d at 751 (Mallet, J., dissenting); Hobbins, 518 N.W.2d at 499 (Shelton, J., dissenting).
However, courts may soon be faced with regulatory barriers that simply make the exercise of the right
to die more difficult, such as the clear and convincing evidentiary standard at issue in Cruzan. In such
cases, courts will apply the undue burden analysis to weigh the extent of the infringement created by
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Applying the Casey undue burden standard to Cruzan, a court would
most likely find that Missouri's clear and convincing evidentiary require-
ment does not create an undue burden on the fundamental right to die.
Arguably, the clear and convincing evidence requirement creates a difficult
hurdle for a person who wishes to exercise the right to die. Most Ameri-
cans do not execute formal living wills or create sufficient oral evidence to
overcome the requirement.2 0 Despite this common lack of preparation,
the actual burden of executing a formal living will does not present a
substantial obstacle against exercising one's right to die. A living will
typically entails a simple notarized statement requesting that no heroic
measures be taken to extend an incapacitated patient's life.2 ' On the
other hand, a challenger might also argue that the very existence of a
prejudicial evidentiary requirement necessarily imposes an undue burden
upon the fundamental right to die. Nonetheless, a court would probably find
that such an evidentiary hurdle does not create an undue burden because,
within certain limits, a state may express its interest in the preservation of
human life by imposing procedural requirements upon the exercise of a
fundamental right.2
Applying the modified undue burden standard would yield the opposite
result. A court would ask a second question: Would an objective observer
view the clear and convincing evidentiary requirement as demonstrating a
value-based approval or disapproval of an incompetent patient's exercise
of the right to die? On its face, an observer might view the Missouri
requirement as value-neutral because it seeks to discover the true wishes of
the incompetent patient. However, Missouri's clear and convincing
requirement does not follow normal evidentiary practice. The requirement
shifts the risk of error to the incompetent patient and constitutes a
heightened, "markedly asymmetrical" standard of evidence. Courts
normally impose the clear and convincing requirement upon states before
they deprive their citizens of their liberty interests, rather than upon citizens
a regulation. Thus, the following analysis of Cruzan under both the Casey and the modified undue
burden standard is designed to highlight the neutrality problems that will likely arise in future right-to-
die cases.
210. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 323-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. BLACK'S LAW DICTboNARY 1599 (6th ed. 1990); see also 497 U.S. at 291-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
212. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2825 (1992) (stating that "under the undue burden standard a State
is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures
do not further a health interest").
213. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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before they can exercise their fundamental rights.214 In order to reflect
neutrality, an evidentiary requirement would have to distribute evenly the
risk of error between the individual and the state.
In addition, the state of Missouri admitted that it sought to trump an
individual's right to die when it asserted an unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life.2" 5 A neutral state interest would more clearly
project a desire for accuracy in determining a patient's wishes, rather than
a desire to override a patient's wishes if those wishes contradict the state's
interests. Thus, based on the atypical use of the clear and convincing
evidentiary requirement and the explicit state intent to override an
individual's right to die, an objective observer would probably find that the
state's legislation did not assume a neutral stance with regard to one's
exercise of the right to die. Therefore, under the modified undue burden
standard, a court would find that the clear and convincing evidentiary
requirement constitutes an undue burden on the fundamental right to die.
V. CONCLUSION
The Casey v. Planned Parenthood decision21 6 created a new method
by which courts can analyze state regulations affecting fundamental rights.
Prior to Casey, the Supreme Court did not tolerate any amount of state
interference when it decided the constitutionality of regulations that directly
affected fundamental rights.2" 7 The Casey decision represents a shift
towards allowing a certain degree of direct state interference with
fundamental rights. The lack of precedent to support this change in
approach shows that the Casey undue burden standard does not rest on
solid footing.21 Nonetheless, lower courts faced with determining the
constitutionality of abortion regulations currently use the undue burden
standard,21 9 and several courts have applied the undue burden standard to
214. Id. at 319-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Mark E. Haddad, Cruzan and the Demands
of Due Process, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 205 (1992) (arguing that states should not follow the clear and
convincing requirement).
215. Haddad, supra note 214, at 205, 208. This goal of protecting human life under any condition
reflects Missouri's belief that the intrinsic value of human life outweighs the derivative value of an
individual's life. See Dworkin, supra note 122, at 406. Professor Dworkin points out that the debate
over the right to die turns on whether a state has a legitimate interest in the detached value of human
life. If it does possess such an interest, then the state can enact laws prohibiting people from ending
their lives. Id. at 396-97.
216. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
217. See supra notes 8-51 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part fl.C.
219. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
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cases involving nonabortion fundamental rights." This new use of the
undue burden standard threatens the protection historically afforded
fundamental rights. Under traditional fundamental rights analysis, a state
may not seek to foster moral conformity through regulations affecting
fundamental rights."m Under the Casey undue burden standard, however,
states may foster moral conformity, so long as the state does not create an
undue burden on the exercise of a fundamental right.'
Two solutions exist. The Supreme Court could abandon use of the undue
burden standard in the abortion context and return to its use of strict
scrutiny. However, given the current moderate trend in the Court, 3 a
return to strict scrutiny does not appear likely. Alternatively, the Supreme
Court and lower courts could modify the undue burden standard as it
currently exists.
In its current form, the undue burden standard allows a state to coerce
citizens into adopting the state's position on moral, value-based issues, even
if those moral issues involve fundamental rights. This moral coercion
contradicts the theory underlying the historical sanctity of fundamental
rights-rights which are protected from the political process and left to the
individual. 4 By contrast, the modified undue burden standard proposed
herein allows state regulation of fundamental rights only if that regulation
reflects moral neutrality.m By ensuring that a state will act neutrally
when it regulates fundamental rights, the modified undue burden standard
protects individual moral autonomy against changing political tides. The
Supreme Court and lower courts should replace the Casey undue burden
standard with the proposed modified undue burden standard in order to
retain the protection traditionally afforded fundamental rights.
Valerie J Pacer
220. See cases cited supra notes 101, 103, 209.
221. See supra Part IV.A.
222. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
223. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 109-12.
224. See Wesf Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
225. See supra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the modified undue burden standard, and Part
V for examples applying the modified standard; see also note 140 (explaining that the modified standard
allows a goal of moral responsibility but not moral conformity).
[VOL. 73:295
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/6
